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SECOND COMMISSION REPORT 
to the EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT and the  COUNCIL 
on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive SUMMARY 
This is the second Commission report to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
implementation of the  1991  Money  Laundering  Directive.  It seeks  to  respond  to  the 
concerns and requests raised by these two institutions in the context of  their examination 
of  the Commission's first report presented in 1995. 
Given the global nature of  the money laundering problem this second report first seeks to 
situate the European Union's anti-m_oney laundering effort within the wider international 
context. It thus reports on the efforts undertaken to spread the message to third <;ountries 
and  also  records  the  considerable  progress  made  in  the  ratification  of the  two  major 
,  international money laundering conventions. 
The basic situation as regards implementation of the Directive is very satisfactory. All of 
the Member States have implemented the Directive in their natioral legislation and only 
one infringement procedure is currently open. 
The  report  notes  the  excellent  progress  made  by· all  the  Member  States  towards  the 
criminalisation of  the  laundering of the  proceeds  of a much wider  range  of serious 
offences. 
It examines the efforts to  combat money  laundering via bureaux de change and other, 
possibly  unregulated,  financial  activities.  It also  notes  progress  in  the  range  of non-
financial activities made subject to the Member States' money laundering legislation and 
considers the question of the application of anti-money laundering measures to certain 
non-financial professions, and in particular the legal professions.· 
In  the above and  a number; of other areas the report makes reference to aspects of the 
detailed  Action  Plan  to  combat organised crime adopted  by  the  Amsterdam  European 
Council. 
The report considers the ongoing work in  various fora to  improve 'the cooperation and 
exchange  of  information  between  the  various  authorities  concerned · with  money 
laundering. 
In response to requests from Parliament the Commission also reports on current trends in 
the techniques used by money launderers and on the work now being undertaken in other 
fora into the macroeconomic effects of money laundering. 
The report  also attempts to provide some initial data on the,results of the  anti-money 
laundering effort. These show that suspicious transaction reports are being made in every 
Member State. The numbers of reported prosecutions and convictions are much tower. 
Similarly the amounts of  money confiscated appear to be small. 
Lastly,  the report concludes that .it  would  now  he  appropriate to  update and  extend  the 
Directive  in  line with  the  wishes of Parliament and  the recommendations of the  Action 
Plan on organised crime. I. INTRODUCTION 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial  system for the 
purpose of  money laundering was adopted on 1  0 June 1991 1• 
Article  17 of the  Dir~ctive provides for regular implementation reports to  the European 
Parliament and the Council, to be presented at least every three years. 
The  Commission's  first report  (COM(95)54  final)  was  presented  in  March  1995.  It 
covered ·12  Member States since the three countries which had just joined the European 
Union at that time were  included, along with Iceland and Norway,  in  a parallel report 
which  the  EFTA  Standing  Committee  had  prepared  covering  the  EFTA  countries 
belonging to the European Economic Area (EEA).  · 
This second report covers the  15  Member States. The EFT  A authorities have prepared a 
parallel  report  for  the  other countries of the  EEA,  namely  Iceland,  Liechtenstein and 
Norway. 
The first report described in detail the way in which the main provisions of the Directive 
had been implemented by  the Member States. It pointed to the  main difficulties which 
they  had encountered and also sought to  indicate  both the outstanding aspects and the 
weak points of  the European anti-money laundering effort. 
The report was examined by the Council in March 1995. The Council's conclusions form 
Annex 1 to this report. 
In- its conclusions the Council laid particular stress on a more coordinated application of 
the  Directive,  including  the  range  of criminal  offences  covered  by  the  anti-money 
laundering law and the professions and types of undertakings outside the conventional 
financial sector subject to the Directive's provisions. 
The Council also fully agreed with the Commission that the strengthening of  systems for 
countering  money  laundering  depended  on  closer  cooperation  between  the  different 
authorities involved in fighting this phenomenon. 
Finally  the  Council  called  on  the  Commission to  continue  its  analysis of the  various 
questions raised and to report back (within 18 months) on its thinking on these issues·. 
The  European  Parliament  held  a  widely  based  discussion  of money  laundering.  It 
examined the Commission's report in  a number of committees and organised a hearing. 
Its  report and  resolution were adopted in  June  19962.  Parliament's 21  point Resolution 
torms Annex 2 to this report. 
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2  Document A4-0187/96 and OJ No C 198, 8.7.1996, p.245. 
2 Parliament  called  for  more  information  on  the  practical  results.  of the  anti-money 
laundering effort, on  new money  laundering techniques being  used and  on the macro-
economic  effects of money  laundering.  It  called  for  the  money  laundering  offence to 
apply to the laundering of  the proceeds of  all organised crime and wanted the Directive to 
cover  directly  all  the  occupations  and  types  of undertaking  involved  or  likely  to  be 
involved  in  money  laundering.  Parliament  called  on  the  Commission 'to  report  back 
within two years and to  present a proposal for  a further directive to· fill  in  the gaps it 
perceived in the European Union's anti-money laundering defences. 
The  purpose of this report is  to  attempt to  respond,  within  a  single document,  to  the 
concerns of  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament and,  to  the  extent  possible,  to · 
supply-the additional information requested by Parliament. 
In  line with the concerns of Parliament and the mandate received from the Council the 
Commission takes  a  wide  approach  in  this  report.  It  examines  the  Union's efforts  to 
• combat money laundering as a whole and does not necessarily limit its coverage to the 
legislation implementing the Directive or to matters falling solely under the first pillar. It 
also seeks to place the European Union's efforts in the international context. 
The following  annexes are attached to this report : 
/ 
•  Annex 1  Conclusions ofthe Council on the Commission's first report 
•  Annex 2  Resolution of  the European Parliament in response to the first report 
•  Annex 3  Signature, ratification and implementation of  the Vienna and Strasbourg 
Conventions 
•  Annex 4  Table of criminal  offences covered  by  the  Member  States'  anti-money 
launde~ing legislation 
•  Annex 5  Action.point 26 from the report on·organised crime presented to and 
approved by the Amsterdam European Council 
·  ·  .•  Annex 6  Non-financial activities covered by the Member States' anti-money 
laundering legislation 
•  Annex 7  Conclusioi1s of  the Egmont Group regarding thcpossihilities of_ 
cooperation between the Member States' financial intelligence units 
•  Annex 8  Data on suspicious transaction reports ·  · 
•  Annex 9  Results of  the reporting system, prosecutions and convictions 
3 II.  Tbe EUROPEAN  UNION's  ANTI-MONEY  LAUNDERING  EFFORT in  the 
(;  LOBAL CONTEXT 
1. General 
The drugs trade and organised crime are  highly  international and take little account of 
frontiers.  Equally  the  laundering  of the  proceeds  of serious  crime  is  increasingly  an 
international phenomenon with  launderers  ready  and  able to  exploit opportunities and 
weaknesses  in  States'  defences  anywhere  in  the  world.  The  fight  against  money 
laundering  has  to  be  seen  in  global  terms.  However  sophisticated  and  advanced  the 
systems put in place by the countries of the European Union may be, they can easily be 
undermined by the absence of or gaps in the defences of other countries. It is therefore 
imperative that the anti-money laundering message be delivered and be heard in every 
country of  the world. 
The  international  tight  against money  laundering  is  led  by  the  Financial  Action  Task 
Force (FA  TF). This body, which was created by the G7 Summrt in  1989, currently has 28 
members:  26  country  members,  representing  the  world's major financial  markets,  plus 
the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. All of the  15  EU  Member 
States are members ofthe FATF. 
The FA TF adopted its 40 Recommendations in  1990 and updated them  in  1996. These 
are  the  measures,  covering  the  areas  of criminal  justice  and  law  enforcement,  the 
financial  system  and  its  regulation  and  international  cooperation,  which  the  FA  TF 
members have agreed to implement and which all countries are encouraged to adopt. 
The F  ATF has now decided that its work must continue after its current mandate expires 
in mid-1999. One of its major tasks in the coming years will be to establish a world-wide 
network in order to spread the anti-money laundering message to all regions of  the globe. 
The F  ~  TF's review of its future work and mission was approved by the F  ATF Ministers 
and Commissioner Monti on 28 April 1998 and by the G7/8 Summit on 15-17 May 1998. 
The United Nations system also plays a major role in the fight against money laundering. 
In  October 1996 the  United  Nations International  Drugs Control  Programme (UNDCP) 
launched  a  global  programme  against  money  laundering  to  he  implemented  in 
cooperation with the  UN  Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division (CPCJD). In 
this way the UN is  broadening its efforts beyond the combating of the laundering of the 
proceeds derived solely from drugs trafficking. Indeed, the UNDCP now comes under the 
umbrella  of  the  United  Nations  Office  of  Drug  Control  and  Crime  Prevention 
(UNODCCP). The tight against money laundering will be one of  the main subjects on the 
agenda of  the UN General Assembly Special Session on drugs to be held in New York in 
June 1998. 
4 2. Role of the Community Directive 
The Community's 1991  money laundering Di):ective was a landmark in the international 
effort  against  money  laundering  in  that  it  gave  legal  force  within  the  EU,  and 
subsequently  in  a  majority  of  the  F  ATF  members,  to  a  number  of  the  40 
. recommendations relating to the prev~ntion of  the misuse of  the financial system. 
At the same time the Directive clearly recognised the global nature of the problem and 
made reference to the two major international conventions relating to money laundering, 
namely  .!he  United  Nations  Convention  against  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs  and 
psychotropic  substances,  Vienna,  1988,  from  which  it  took  the  definition  of money 
laundering, and  the  Council  of Europe Convention  on  laundering,  search,  seizure  and 
confiscation of the proceeds from  crime. Strashourg,  1990, one of the  main purposes of 
which is to facilitate and promote international cooperation. 
Two of the FATF's 40  Recommendations relate to  the signing and ratification of these 
two international Conventions. 
3. Implementation of the Vienna and Strasbourg Conventions by the Member States 
In a statement by their Government representatives  meeting within the Council annexed 
to the Directive the Member States undertook to enact crimimillegislation enabling them 
to comply with their obligations under the Vienna and Strasbourg Conventions. 
All  of the  Member  States  have  now  signed  and  ratified  the  Vienna  Convention  and 
implementation of  the relevant anti-money laundering articles is now complete. 
Considerable progress has also been made in  respect of the Strasbourg Convention. The 
precise  situation  as  regards  the  signing,,  ratification  and  implementation  of  this 
Convention  is  set  out  in  Annex  3.  All  of the  Member- States  have  now  signed  the 
Convention while  II have also  ratified  it.  The Action Plan to  combat organised crime3 
submitted  to  and  approved  by  the  Amsterdam  European  Council  further  commits 
Member States to  complete ratification of this (and other) international  instruments by 
the  end  of  1998  or  provide  a  written  report  every  six  months  on  the  difficulties 
encountered. 
4.  Implementation  of  the  Directive,  or  equivalent  standards,  by  non-member 
countries 
4.1.  l;'he countries of the European Economic Area 
The Directive applies to  Iceland,  Liechtenstein and Norway under the EEA Agreement 
and  the  EFTA Surveillance Authority has produced a parallel report on  implementation 
in those countries. 
OJ No C 251. 15.8.1997, p.l. 
5 . 4.2.  Central and Eastern European countries 
The money laundering Directive is an integral part of the acquis communautaire and all 
candidate countries will be required· to implement it. Efforts to assist in this process form 
part of  the pre-accession strategy. 
All  of the  Association  Agreements  contain  an  article  committing  the  signatories  to 
combating  money  laundering  in  line  with  the  Community  and  other  international 
standards, notably those ofthe FATF. 
Under  the  PHARE  multi-country  program!lle  to  combat  drugs  the  Commission  is 
currently  involved  in  technical assistance efforts in the field  of anti-money  laundering 
measures in  1  J countries of  central and eastern Europe. 
Reference should also be made to action point 3 of the Action plan to  combat organised 
crime which "encourages the Council and the Commission to define in common with the 
candidate countries of Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  including  the  Baltic  States, a  pre-
accession Pact on cooperation against crime ... ". 
4.3. The New Independent States· 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the EU  and the New Independent 
States (NIS)  contain provisions to establish  mutual  cooperation  in  a  number of areas 
related  to  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  including  money  laundering.  Following  the 
Council's decision to  open up  the  TACIS  programme to  such actions it is  likely that 
technical  assistance projects  in  this  area  in  Central  Asian countries  will  be  identified 
soon. 
4.4. Non-F  ATF members of the Council of Europe 
The  Commission  is  providing.a financial  contribution  towards  the  Council  of Europe 
mutual  evaluation  project  intended  to  promote  the  extensio~  of  the  FA TF  40 
recommendations, and the FATF procedures of self-assessment and mutual evaluation to 
21  European countries  not belonging to  the  F  ATF.  The Commission contribution will 
help to .finance_ the evaluation of  the PHARE countries. 
4.5. The Caribbean 
In the Caribbean area, the Commission has launched a major regional money laundering 
control project in cooperation with the USA.  This project will  be  implemented through 
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). 
4.6 Andean Community 
In  February  1998  the  five  members  of the  Andean  Community  (Bolivia,  Colombia, 
Ecuador,  Peru  and· Venezuela)  and the  Commission.  signed  a  financial  agreement to 
establish  a  regional  programme  for  the  fight  against  drugs,  including  an  anti-money 
laundering component. 
6 4.7. Asia 
In the context of the follow-up to the first ASEM Summit of March 1996, the first Asia-
Europe (ASEM) Finance Ministers meeting held in Bangkok in September 1997 agreed 
"to take concrete steps to  strengthen cooperation between the EU  and Asia in the  fight 
against money laundering". Proposals were presented to the ASEM II  Summit  held in 
London in April  1998  to give effect to  this agreement, and the Summit recognised the 
impact on the transparency of financial  systems of the  fight  against money  laundering 
and the  need for cooperation between the ASEM countries.  In this context exploratory 
discussions  with  the  Secretariat  of the  Asia-Pacific  Group  cin .  money  laundering  are 
currently underway. 
4.8. Other non-member countries 
Lastly the Commission continues to seek to incorporate an anti-money laundering. clause 
in  all  the agreements, of whatever type, it concludes with  non-member countries.  The 
standard clause refers to  efforts and cooperation to  avoid money laundering and  to  the 
establishment of suitable standards against money laundering equivalent to those adopted 
in the EU and in international fora such as the FA TF . 
. 
III. !MPLEMENT  A  TlON of the DIRECTIVE by the MEMBER STATES. 
1. General situation 
All of the Member States have now implemented the Money  Laundering Directive and 
have officially notified their implementing legislation to the Commission.  Examination 
of some of  the implementing, or supplementary, legislation received only recently is still 
continuing. 
There is only one infringement proceeding currently in progress under Article 169 of  the 
Treaty  for  non-application  or  incorrect  application  of the  Directive.  This  is  against 
Austria and concerns in particular the continued existence in that country of anonymous 
savings accounts. The· Commission decided  in  October 1997 to  bring this matter before 
.  the Court of  Justice. 
2. The prohibition of money laundering 
Article  2 of the  Directive provides that money  laundering shall  be  "prohibited" in  all 
Member States. 
As explained in the Commission's first report it had not been possible to reach agreement 
in  the .  Council  on  a  requirement  in  the  Directive  to  criminalise  money  laundering. 
Nonetheless the statement annexed to the Directive gave this commitment (albeit outside 
the framework of the Directive) and all  of the Member States have in  fact  made money 
laundering a criminal offence. 
7 The  Directive  only  requires  the  prohibition  of the  laundering  of drugs  proceeds,  as 
required by the Vienna Convention, but encourages Member States to apply the approach 
of the Strasbourg Convention, namely of combating the.  laundering of the proceeds of a 
wider range of criminal offences (often referred to as "predicate offences"). The FATF 
strengthened  its  relevant  recommendation  in  1996  to  state  that  "each  country  should 
extend  the  offence of drug  money  laundering to  one  based  on serious offences".  This 
corresponds  io  a  growing  trend  based  on  the  dramatic  increase  in  non-drugs  based 
organised crime and  on the  realisation  that  having a wide  range of predicate otiences 
should improve suspicious transaction reporting and facilitate  international cooperation 
between judicial and police authorities in different countries. 
This trend has been very noticeable among the EU  Member States. Annex 4 provides an 
up-to-date  picture  of the  predicate  offences  covered  by  their  anti-money  laundering 
legislation. All the Member States have or (in the case of Luxembourg) are in the process 
of extending their legislation to outlaw the laundering of the proceeds of a wide range of 
serious crime. Parliament's call to the Member States set out in point 5 of its Resolution 
has in fact already been answered. 
This also means that the requirement contained in Action point 26(e) of the Action Plan 
to  combat  organised  crime  that  "the  reporting  obligation  in  Article  6  of the  money 
laundering Directive should be  extended to  all  offences connected with serious crime" 
has already beeh fulfilled to a very large extent. 
Reference should also be made here to the Convention on the protection of the European 
Communities'  financial  interests and  its  two  additional  Protocols.  The  Member States 
have  undertaken to criminalise the  laundering of the  proceeds of fraud  and corruption 
within the meaning of  the Convention. An essential complement to this commitment will 
be the extension to such conduct of  the identification and reporting obligations. 
Despite the  progress  made  by  the  Member States  in  the  coverage of their anti-money 
laundering legislation the question nevertheless arises as to  whether it is acceptable that 
the Directive, which remains one of the basic international texts in this area, should fail 
so clearly now to reflect the current reality. 
3. The coverage of financial sector activities 
The  Directive  applies  to  credit  institutions  and  to  financial  institutions  in  the  widest 
sense.  Thus  virtually  all  financial-sector  intermediaries  arc  su~jcct to.  the  Directive's 
requirements. 
3.1. Bureaux de change 
Much attention has been paid to the involvement of money changing offices (bureaux de 
change) in  the  process of money laundering. These offices do in fact clearly fall  within 
the scope of the  Directive but, as the  tirst  report stated, were  not subject to  prudential 
supervision  in  a  number of Member States.  Given  the  increasing  number of cases  in 
which these offices have been found to be involved in money laundering, virtually all of 
the Member States have now subjected them to some sort of  official supervision. 
8 The current situation is  that orily two Member States, namely Denmark and the United 
Kingdom,  impose  no  special  requirements  on  bureaux  de  change.  However,  the  UK 
Government has announced that it intends to bring bureaux de change under supervision, 
while  Denmark  has  reported  that  it  is  currently  reviewing  the  situation.  The  other 
Member States  either have  a  system of prudential  control  or impose  requirements of 
registration .and  authorisation  or  a  fit-and-proper  ~est  for  managers  or  shareholders. 
However, all of the Member States have  brought  bureaux de change under their anti-
money laundering  legislation.  The  United  Kingdom and  Denmark,  while  not  having  a 
particular supervisory regime, nonetheless report a good response from  them in terms of 
the number of  suspicious transactions reported. 
3.2. Other financial activities  ' 
In its report Parliament also refers to other possibly unregulated activities, such as money 
transmission services, leasing and factoring.  These activities again fall  within the scope 
of the money laundering Directive and Member States should ensure that its obligations, 
such as client identification, record keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions are 
respected.  In  respect  of such  undertakings  Parliament  called  on  the· Commission  to 
consider whether and to  what extent provisions on supervision can be  incorporated into 
the Directive. 
The Commission would point out that the present Directive is not concerned directly with 
supervisory  issues  and  the  imposition  of  coordinated  supervisory  or  prudential 
requirements  is  invariably  linked  to  the  f;;tcilitation  of  cross-border  services  or 
establishment. Furthermore certain activities do not exist in all the Member States or may 
only be carried on by other regulated institutions. General company law may also provide 
certain safeguards. 
However,  in  the  event that a  particular unregulated  financial  activity  revealed serious 
money  laundering  problems,  the  Commission  would  expect  Member  States  to  take 
appropriate action, as  they have done .in  the case of. bureaux de change. Firstly, this is 
required  by  the  Directive  and  s-econdly  all  the  Member  States  have  accepted  FA  TF 
Recommendation  No  8,  which  states  that  "governments  should  ensure  that  these 
[unregulated]  institutions  are  subject  to  the  same  anti-money  laundering  laws  or 
regulations  as  all  other  financial  institutions  and  that  these  laws  or  regulations  are 
implemented effectively".  The Commission  would  urge  Member States to  pay  careful 
attention  to  this  area.  The  Commission  itself will  continue  to  monitor  the  situation 
closely, notably via the annual FATF  R~ports on money laundering techniques (see point 
111.7 of  this report) and throughthe work of  the Contact Committee.  ~ 
4. The coverage of  activities outside the financial sector 
Article 12 of the Directive provides that "Member States ·shall ensure that the provisions 
of this Directive are  extended in  whole  or in  part to  professions and  to  categories of 
.undertakings,  other than  the  credit and  financial  institutions  referred  to  in  Article  1, 
which engage in activities which are particularly likely to be used for money-laundering 
purposes". 
9 As the first  report noted, this article imposes an  obligation but its broad wording allows 
Member States· a large measure of discretion in its application. 
In  order to  coordinate as  far  as  possible the appliGation of this provision Article  13(  d) 
gives the Directive's Contact Committee the role of  examining "whether a profession or a 
category of undertaking should be  included in the scope of Article 12  where it has been 
established that such profession or category of undertaking has been  used  in a Member 
State for money laundering". 
The Contact Committee has been engaged in this task for some time now but has not so 
far  been  able  to  reach  a  final  agreement  on  a  formal  Committee  Opinion  on  the 
application of Article 12. The main sticking point remains the obligations to  be  imposed 
on certain professions and in particular the legal professions. 
This sensitivity was already apparent in  the Council's conclusions on the Commission's 
tirst  report  when  it  encouraged  "  a  more  coordinated  application  of the  Directive, 
particularly  with  respect  to  ......  the  professions  and  types  of undertakings  which  are 
subject  to  the  Directive's  provisions  takinK  into  account  the  special  status  (~lleKal 
prt?fessions ...  ". 
In  point 4 of its  resolution Parliament "calls on the Commission, taking account of the 
preliminary work of the Contact Committee, to  submit a proposal for  a revision of the 
Directive ....  to  include within the  direct scope of the  Directive  those occupations and 
types  of enterprise  which can  definitely  be  considered to  be  involved  or likely  to  be 
involved directly or indirectly in money laundering". 
The work of the  Contact Committee .  in  this area has  led  to  the  following  preliminary 
conclusions : 
any decision to  include a profession in  the scope of  any  individual  Member State's 
legislation should keep the balance between the burdens to  be  imposed and the  real 
risk of money laundering ; 
- it  would  be  incompatible with  the  spirit of the  Directive  if proll!ssions carrying out 
activities  involving  in  fact  a  comparable  risk  of money  laundering  were  not  made 
subject to similar controls ;  · 
Member States should carefully consider. whether a number of specified professions 
involved  in  their country a demonstrable risk of money  laundering and,  if that were 
the  case,  they  should  bring  the  professions  concerned  under certain  aspects of the 
legislation implementing the. Directive where this was likely to prove effective ;  · 
the professions in question are the gambling industry, involving casinos, bookmakers 
and lotteries; dealers in high-value items, namely real estate agents, jewellers, dealers 
in precious metals and precious stones, art and antique dealers, auctioneers artd coin 
and stamp dealers ; 
10 the  provlSlons  of  the  Directive  which  might  be  imposed  would  include  the 
identification requirement, when payment over a specified amount ·was made by cash 
or bearer instrument, a record-keeping requirement and a possible obligation to report 
suspicious transactions;  at the same time for any such requirements to be meaningful 
the necessary procedures to enforce them would have to be established ; 
as  regards  the  professions,  a  majority of delegations  have  been  able  to  agree  as  a 
general  principle  that  the  legal  professions  could  be  made  subject  to  the  money 
laundering provisions when  they  carry  out some  kind  of financial  intermediation  in 
financial  transactions  and  agreed  to  consider  carefully  the  need  to  apply  the  anti-
money laundering provisions to  lawyers and  notaries, taking into account their status 
and the effective scope of  their activities ; 
however a  number of delegations  felt  unable  to  make  any  distinction  between  the 
different  services  which  members of the  legal  professions  might  provide  to  their 
clients and pointed out that in their countries these (and other) professions' obligation 
of discretion  and  client  confidentiality  was  absolute;  certain  Member  States  also 
insisted  that  they  would  wish  to  fully_ explore  the  possibilities  offered  by  self-
regulati_on  before <:ontemplating making these professions subject to  the anti-money 
launderii}g legislation. 
This is how matters currently stand as regards the discussion of this issue in the Contact 
Committee. 
However the question of the application of anti-money laundering rules to  professions 
and activities outside the conventional financial  sector has also been discussed  in  other 
f()ra.  The  conclusions  of the  Dublin  European  Council  of December  1996  contain  a 
commitment  to  the  "full  application  of the  Directive  on  money  laundering  anti  its 
possible extension to those relevant professions and  bodies outside the classical financial 
sector".  That same European Council  established the  High  Level  Group on Organised 
Crime  with  the  task  of drawing  up  a  comprehensive  action  plan  containing  specific 
recommendations, including realistic timetables for carrying out the work. Its action plan 
was approved at the Amsterd~  European Council in June 1997. Action point 26, much 
of which  is  concerned  with anti-money  laundering measures  (and  is· attached  to  this 
report as Annex 5) states in (e) that  "the re'porting obligation in Article 6 of the money 
laundering Directive should be extended to  ....... persons and professions other than the 
financial institutions mentioned in the-Directive". The target date set to achieve this is the 
end of 1998. 
The' Contact Committee continued its discussions on the application of the  Directive to 
vulnerable non-financial professions at its meeting on  11  December 1997, with particular 
referen~e to  the  Action  Plan.  The  Commission  noted  the  ambitious  and  far-reaching 
recommendations of the Action Plan in this area, which had been approved at the highest 
political level. 
The discussion concentrated on the professions and in particular on the-legal professions. 
The Commission explored again with the Member States whether a distinction could be 
made between the activities of the  le.gal professions involving legal advice, defence and 
litigation  and  other  less-privileged  commercial  activities  performed  by  these  s~e  · 
professions. 
11 As regards the  professions  the Action Plan on organised crime also contains an action 
point which may be of  relevance to the  prevention of the misuse of the services of  these 
professions  for  the  purpose  of money  laundering.  Action  point  12  envisages  that 
"measures to shield certain vulnerable professions  from  influences of organised  crime 
should  be  developed,  for  instance  through  the  adoption  of codes of conduct.  A study 
should  propose  specific  measures,  including  legislative  action,  to  prevent  notaries, 
lawyers, accountants and auditors from  being exploited or getting involved  in  organised 
crime and  ensure that their professional organisations are  engaged  in  the establishment 
and enforcement of such codes of  conduct at the European level". A possible joint action 
is envisaged for mid 1999. 
Annex  6  presents  the  current  situation  as  regards  the  coverage  of  non-financial 
professions by the Member States' anti-money laundering legislation. It will be seen that 
much progress has been made since the Commission's first report. In addition a number 
of Member  States  have  plans  to  further  extend  the  coverage  of their  legislation. 
Nonetheless there are still considerable differences in coverage from one State to another. 
· In  view of these differences and the  shift,  noted  by the  FA  TF, of laundering activities 
from  the traditional financial sector to  non-financial professions or enterprises, it  would 
seem strange if the ambition reflected in the Action Plan was not matched by that shown 
by the Commission within its area of  competence. 
5. Identification of customers in non-face to face transactions 
Article 3 of the  Directive requires that banks and  financial  institutions should identify 
their clients, keep appropriate records and  take reasonable measures to  seek to  identify 
beneficial owners. 
In its report Parliament expressed concern at the weakening of the client identification 
requirements, particularly in the context of  direct banking. 
The Contact Committee has discussed the problem of non-face to face transactions on a 
number of occasions and has agreed a number of principles to  be applied to ensure that 
customers are adequately identified. 
The whole area of customer identification has also been  reviewed by  the FA TF, which 
annexed to its 1996-97 annual report  an evaluation of measures taken by FA TF members 
dealing with identification. Its conclusion was that "on the whole, identification regimes 
in  FATF members arc deemed satisfactory". lt also noted that this question had to be kept 
under review with particular reference to  the development of electronic transactions and 
financial services through· new technologies. 
The Commission would  agree with these conclusions. 
12 6. Cooperation  between authorities concerned'with money laundering 
This point. which is of  crucial importance if  the EU and international fight against mo~ney 
laundering is to be successful, was raised both by the Council and by  Parliament. 
In  Article  6  of the  Directive  reference  is  made  ·to  "the  authorities  responsible  for 
combating money laundering". It is not specified who those authorities should be nor, in 
contrast with other directives in  the financial sector, is any specific provision made for 
cross frontier cooperation between those authorities. 
·The Commission's tirst report noted that the Directive made no-attempt to harmonise the 
relevant law enforcement aspects, including the .nature and organisation of the authorities 
which should receive the  suspicious transaction reports,  the  procedures to  be  followed 
once  the  information  had  been  transmitted  and  the  sharing of information  with  other 
national and foreign authorities. 
The first report stated, however, that appropriate coordination on these and other matters 
, related to law enforcement would contribute to reinforcing the efficiency of the reporting 
scheme in particular and of  the anti-money lal!ndering system as a whole. 
A first point to  be  made is that full  implementation of the  Strasbourg Convention of the 
Council  of Europe  by  all  the  Member  States  would  provide  an· improved  basis  for 
international cooperation. As indicated above (see point 11.3) there seems to be a genuine 
commitment to achieve this objective as rapidly as possible. 
However, even this may not be enough., Article  18  of the  Strasbourg Convention still 
contains numerous grounds on which co-operation may be refused. 
Various  efforts  are  already  under  way  to  improve·  in  particular  the  exchange  of 
information : 
6.1. Exchange of information and co-operati_on between the bodies set up to receive . 
suspicious transaction reports 
Article  6 of the Directive  implies  that  Member  States  must designate  an  c;1uthority  or 
authorities to receive suspicious transaction reports. These bodies are sometimes referred 
to as Financial Intelligence Units or FlUs. 
The Directive does not specify what form  those bodies should take and, in .contrast to 
other  Community  financial  services  legislation,  does  not  contain  provisions  on 
professional secrecy and on the exchange of information. Given the different status and 
rQle  of the FlUs as  they have developed in  the Member States (see below) it would be 
extremely difficult now fully to coordinate this aspect of  the anti-money laundering effort 
under the first pillar of  EU law. However, given the importance of this issue the Directive 
could  perhaps  set  out some  provisions  for  relations  between  the  administrative  FlUs 
while encouraging cooperation with and between those of  a different type. 
13 In June 1995 the US  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) and the Belgian 
Cellule  de  traitement  des  informations  tinancicres  (CTIF)  organised  in· the  Egmont 
Palace in Brussels the first international meeting of FlUs.  This Egmont Group has now 
met on five occasions, has become a genuine international forum and, though having no 
official status, has become an essential element in the international fight against money 
laundering. 
The general objectives of  the Egmont Group can be summarised as follows4 : 
to establish the list of  all FlUs 
- to organise meetings to discuss operational problems 
to  share the experience of the Group to  assist countries considering or preparing the 
creation of  an FlU 
to  encourage  and  facilitate  international  cooperation  and  exchange  of information 
between the various FlUs. 
Over 30 countries have participated in the work of the Egmont Group from Europe, the 
Americas, Asia and Australasia. A number of international organisations, including the 
Commission,  have  taken  part  as  observers.  The  Group  has  three  working  parties, 
covering legal obstacles, means of  communication and training. 
The legal working party has drawn up a model cooperation agreement or memorandum 
of understanding (MOU).  Via a questionnaire the working party has  also attempted to 
draw  up  an  inventory  of the  possibilities,  conditions  and  iimitations  for  cooperation-
between the relevant FlUs ofthe participating countries. 
The  main  obstacle  has  been  found  to  be  the  di ffercnt  nature of the  FlUs  in  different 
countries. The three main categories arc  administrative/intermediary,  police or  judicial 
authorities, though some may be  mixed  police/judicial authorities while for others their 
precise status may not be clear. 
The breakdown for the Member States is as  tollows (source: Egmont Group international 
cooperation  survey) : 
Intermediary  body  Belgium,  Finland  (FSA),  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Netherlands, 
Spain 
Police  authority  Austria,  Finland  (MLID),  Germany,  Ireland,  Sweden,  United 
Kingdom 
- .Judicial authority : Luxembourg, Portugal 
·- Mixed policc(judicial authority : Denmark 
4  Information based on the 1995-96 annual report ofthe CTIF. 
14 Problems of cooperation and exchange of information can and do arise because of the 
different legal nature of  the FlUs. This is not always an insurmountable obstacle as some 
bilateral cooperation agreements do exist even where the nature of the FlUs is different  -
(e.g:  between an administrative and a police service).  However, certain Member States 
are currently prevented from concluding such agreements because their law provides that 
police services can only cooperate with other police services using existing channels. 
In  any case bilateral agreements are  not the ideal  solution and  a  multilateral  approach, 
perhaps based on an EU or international convention, would. be preferable. It is clear that a 
solution to  this problem of the flow of information between FllJs would greatly enhance 
the international effort to cm11bat money laundering. 
Annex  7  sets  out,  as  regards  the  EU  Member  States,  the  current  conclusions  of the 
Egmont legal  working group as  regards the  general  possibility of bilateral agreements 
and the direct exchange of  information. 
Another problem affecting the flow of  information lies in the special-nature and treatment 
in many  Member  States of the  information  resulting  from  the  suspicious transaction 
reports made by financial institutions to the FlUs. It is often the case that this information 
is  treated  as  especially  confidential  (no  doubt  to  win  the  confidence of the  financial 
sector) and it  is  laid down that this information should not be automatically circulated in 
the· traditional  police(judicial  circuits.  The  FlUs  will  often  filter  this  information  and 
carry out an  initial analysis before it is passed on to these circuits. This filter might itself 
be a police service but one that is set apart. 
6.2.  Exchange of money  laundering information  once i¢  is  available to  police and 
judicial authorities 
It  is  necessary to  bear this filter function in  mind in  the context of the feasibility study 
currently  being  undertaken  in  the  context of the  third  pillar  concerning  an  EU-wide 
computerised data exchange system for money laundering related transaction information 
for investigation purposes. This project has been discussed in various third pillar bodies 
and in particular in the Drugs and Organised Crime Working Party. The information in 
question would already have passed through the filter stage and would be  information 
·available to and used by  law enforcement authorities. Action point 26(a) of the Action 
plan on organised crime confirms the commitment to this exercise (see Annex 5).  This 
system, which would take account of the  possibilities offered. by  EDU/Europol, would 
provide a  valuable additional tool  to  the  police efforts against money  laundering.  It  is 
unlikely,  however,  that  it  _would  do away  with  the need  for.cnhanccd. cooperation  and 
cxehungc ofinli.mnation hctwccnthc FlUs thcn1sclvcs. 
15 A legal basis for exchange of information is opened up by the second additional Protocol 
to  the  Convention  on  the .penal  protection  of the  European  Communities'  financial 
interests). Article 7 of the Protocol provides for  cooperation between the Member States 
and  the  Commission  in  the  fight  against the  laundering of the  proceeds of fraud  and 
corruption  against  the  Communities'  financial  interests.  To  this  end,  the  competent 
authorities in the Member States may exchange information with the Commission so as 
to  make  it  easier to  establish the  facts  and  to  ensure  effective  action  against money 
laundering. 
7. Techniques of money laundering  (typologies) 
In  point 3 of its Resolution, Parliament called on the Commission to "report on new types 
of money laundering arising from changes in  business practices and money transfers, and 
to submit appropriate proposals for combating it''. 
The  European  Commission  is  not  itself a  direct  source  of expertise  on  the  different 
techniques used by  money launderers and on the trends in the practices used by criminal 
elements. It does, however, monitor closely the work and reports of  other bodies. 
The 1997 World Drugs Report produced by the UNDCP6 contains an  interesting chapter 
on money laundering and describes various techniques that are currently used. 
The most useful regular publication on money laundering techniques is the annual Report 
on money laundering typologies produced by the FA  TF. These reports are annexed to the 
/  FA  TF  Annual  Reports  and  are  publicly  available  via  the  FA  TF  website  at 
http://www  .oecd.org/fatf/ 
One  of the concluding paragraphs of the  1996-97  FA TF  report  states  that "as regards 
money laundering techniques, thc most noticeable trend  is the continuing increase in  the 
usc  by  money launderers of non-bank  financial  institutions and non-Jinancial  businesses 
relative  to  banking  institutions.  This  is  believed  to  reflect  the  increased  level  of 
. compliance by  bank~ with anti-money laundering measures. Traditional methods remain 
/  most  popular,  as  is  demonstrated  by  the  increase  in  cash  smuggling  across  national 
borders,  and  the  smurfing of cash  deposits  followed  by  telegraphic  transfers  to  other 
jurisdictions. In  the non-bank financial  sector, the use of bureaux de  change or money 
remittance businesses to dispose of  criminal proceeds remains the most often cited threat. 
Money  launderers  continue  to  receive  the  assistance  of professional  facilitators,  who 
· assist in  a range of ways to mask th€;  origin and ownership of tainted. funds.  The use of 
shell  companies,  usually  incorporated  in  otlshore jurisdictions,  is  the  most  c,ommon 
technique, with the use of  accounts held by relatives or: friends also being popular". 
OJ No C221. 19.7.1997, p.l2. 
6  Oxford University Press 1997- ISBN 0-19-829299-6 
16 An annex to the same FATF typologies report is  concerned with issues concerning m:w 
payment  technologies.  FATF  has  taken  the  lead ·in  providing  a  forum  in  which ·to 
coordinate  and  facilitate  communication  between  the  e-money  industry  and  the  law 
enforcement/regulatory communities and interested international organisations. 
The main concerns relate to the possibility of greater ease of transferability of large sums 
of money, possibly permitting anonymous operation or providing no audit trail. 
The general feeling among money laundering experts seems to be that this is,a problem 
for the near future rather than a problem of  the moment. 
FATF  states that  "electronic money  (e-money)  has  the  potential  to  make  it  easier  for 
criminals to hide the source of  their proceeds and move those proceeds without detection. 
And it is safe to assume that if these new systems develop in such ways as to somehow 
better suit  the criminals' needs than existing payment systems, they will use them''. 
The Action Plan on organised crime provides in action point 5 for a cross-frontier study 
on  high-technology  crime  and  states  that  "attention  should .  be  paid  both  to  illegal 
practices (such as  the  use of these  technologies  by  criminal  organisations to  facilitate 
their activities) or illegal contents". 
The Commission will continue to monitor developments in the area of new technologies 
very closely. 
8. Money la~ndering  and the changeover to the Euro 
The physical changeover as  from  1 January 2002  will  he  an  enormous operation.  The 
shorter the period the greater will he the pressure on the tinancial system. 
It  is anticipated that a vast amount of dormant cash will  emerge held by people who do 
not have bank accounts. By definition these people will not be known to the banks when 
they seek to change their money.  T-here  is  a:  fear that criminal money will also emerge 
either to  be  fed  into  existing  bank accounts or to  be  pre-laundered (exchange of used 
small denomination notes for new, larger denomination notes). 
The Commission has said from  the outset that money laundering defences must not be 
relaxed in the context of the changeover to the single currency. This will clearly apply to 
the  opening  of new  accounts  and  io  transactions  above  the  ECU  15  000  threshold. 
However, it will be more difficult for banks to identify suspicious transactions below that 
threshold, given the  pressure they  will  be under and the appearance at  their counters of 
large numbers of unknown customers. 
It  has been agreed at  the Money  Launderi~1g Contact Committee that the Cot1Jmittee will 
have to examine this question in depth to examine whether any additional safeguards will 
he  needed and would be feasible.  Discussions will also need to he held with the hankinc 
I  ~ 
sector. 
17 9. The macroeconomic effects of money laundering 
In  point  15  of its  Resolution  Parliament  requests  the  Commission  to  report  on  the 
possible monetary and other macroeconomic effects of  money laundering. 
The Commission has not itself carried out any research in this area, nor does it have the 
resources to do so.  Indeed the only body which has carried out work in this interesting 
but extremely complex area appears to be the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The FA  TF itself, in its albeit limited examination of  this topic, has also relied on the I  M F 
to  launch the discussion. The IMF presented a statJ statement oil this subject at the FA TF 
Plenary in June 1'996. Two IMF working papers have also been issued7. 
The following paragraphs quote extensively from a review of these two papers  publish~d 
in the  29 July 1996 edition of  the JMF Survey. 
It is concluded  that although difficult to  measure, the magnitude of the sums involved 
and the extent of  the criminal activities that generate [criminal] income have implications 
for both the domestic and the international allocation of  resources and macroeconomic 
stability: 
Although, · the  IMF  repor:ts.  there  is  currently  no  theoretical  literature  on  the 
macroeconomic  effects of money  laundering,  indirect  macro-based empirical  research 
and related studies of crime and th.e  underground economy, coupled with the pervasive 
role  of money  laundering  in  illegal  activity,  suggest  that  money  laundering  may  be 
sufficiently widespread to exert an independent impact on the macroeconomy. 
The common theme of the available research  is  that if  crime, underground activity, and 
the associated money laundering occur on a sufficiently large scale, policy makers must 
take them into account. 
Money launderers generally do not look for the highest rate of return on the money they 
launder,  but for  the  place or investment that  most easily allows the recycling of their 
money - even if  this requires accepting a lower rate of  return:. These movements may well 
be  in  directions  opposite  to  those  that  would  be  expected  on  the  basis  of economic 
fundamentals. Money may therefore move from countries with good economic policies 
and activities with higher rates of return to  countries with poorer policies and activities 
with lower rates of return. Thus, because of money laundering the world's capital tends 
to he invested less optimally than in the ahscnce of such activities. As a consequence of 
sul:h  count~rintuiliw capital  movements,  policymak~rs' may  he  conl'uscd  ahout  the 
policies to  he  pursued and may respond inappropriately. For exampk, a shill in  appar~nt 
money demand - owing to  money laundering that is  nowhere rellcch.:d  in  the' data- could 
have consequences to~ interest and exchange rate volatifity.  · 
7  "Money laundering and the international financial  system " by  Vito Tanzi, working paper No 96/55 
and "Macroeconomic implications of money laundering" by Peter J. Quirk, working paper No 96/66. 
18 At the national level, therefore, large financial  flows related to money laundering could 
influence variables such as exchange rates and interest rates. On the international level, 
capital movements originating from laundering activities - especially when they are seen 
as temporary - could have destabilising effects because of the integrated nature of global 
fii"~:ancial  markets.  Financial  difficulties  originating  in  one  centre  can  easily  spread  to 
others, thus transforming a national problem into a systemic one. 
The two  working  papers  both  emphasise that ·the  d(!velopment  of efficient and  stable 
capital markets requires that participants have full  confidence in them. If markets were to 
be  contaminated  by  money  controlled  by  criminal  clements,  they· would  react  more 
dramatically to rumours and false statistics, thus generating more instability. 
The transparency and  soundness of financial  markets are key elements in the effective 
() 
functioning of economies, and money laundering can threaten. both. Criminally obtained 
money  can  corrupt  financial  market  officials,  and  the  damage  can  be  long  lasting, 
because the credibility of  markets, though quickly lost, takes a long time to be· rebuilt. 
In its presentation to the FA  TF Plenary the IMF summarised the potential macroecomic 
consequences of  money laundering as follows :  '  , 
•  changes  in  the. denland  l()r  money  that  seem  unrelated  to  measured  changes  111 
fundamentals 
•  volatility  in  exchange  rates  and  interest  rates  due  to  unanticipated  cross-border 
transfers of  funds 
•  increased instability of liabilities and heightened 'risks for  asset quality for financial 
institutions,  creating systemic risks  for  the  stability of the  financial  sector and  for 
monetary developments generally  · 
•  adverse effects  on tax  collection  and  the  allocation  of public  expenditures  due  to 
misreporting of  income and wealth 
•  contamination  effects  on  legal  transactions  as  transactors  become  concerned  about 
possible criminal involvement,  and 
•  other country-specilic distrihutional c!Tects or asset price huhhles liue to disposition of 
''black money". 
Thl.)·  IMF  conclulil.)d  that  it  intl.)nded  to  ex<.uninl.)  closcly  the  implications  of money 
laundering,  particularly  in  rl.)spect  of th9sc  countries  where  an  analysis  of money 
laundering  is  particularly  important  for  understanding  the  behaviour  of  the 
macroeconomy (for example, in countries where drugs or other illegal exports are known 
to be important or where weaknesses in the fiscal regime encourages money laundering). 
19 The IMF is clearly particularly concerned about the situation in the countries with which 
it  is  especially  involved.  It  is  recognised  that  some  countries  will  be  much  more 
·  vulnerable than others.  When this point of Parliament's resolution was discussed in the 
Money Laundering Contact Committee (November 1996) one delegation stated that any 
macroeconomic  effect  of money  laundering  was  probably  only  marginal  in  a  major 
industrialised country. 
Although this view was not contradicted the Committee felt that the Commission should 
as a minimum try  to  monitor the work being carried on in this technical and specialist 
area in other fora. This the Commission will endeavour to do. 
10. The res~lts of  the anti-money laundering effort 
In  its discussions of the Commission's first report Parliament attached great importance 
to  the collection of information on the results of the considerable efforts being made to 
combat  money  laundering.  Indeed  point  I  of Parliament's  resolution  links  the  full 
transposition of the  Directive  with  the  presentation of a detailed  report  indicating  the 
number of suspicious transactions reported, the  number of money  laundering cases and 
convictions and the amounts of money confiscated. 
Before  reporting  on  its  efforts  to  obtain  the  information  sought  by  Parliament,  the 
Commission would wish to  stress once again the preventive objective of the  directive. 
This is  reflected  in  its  title  which refers to  the  "prevention of the  use of the financial 
system for the purpose of  money laundering". 
Ideally potential  money launderers should find  the  financial  system well defended and 
should  be  discouraged  from  attempting to  use  it.  There  is  some evidence  that this  is 
happening.  Increases  in  cross-frontier  movements  of cash,  the  search  for  laundering 
possibilities outside the  traditional  financial  sector and  reported  increases in the actual 
cost of money  laundering  point  to  some  success  in  making  money  laundering  more 
difficult and expensive for organised crime. 
The Commission and  the  Member States therefore  believe  that  it  would  be  wrong  to 
judge the results of the Directive in particular and of the anti-money laundering effort in 
general solely:_ on the basis of  certain relatively crude statistical indicators. 
At the same time,  the system of the Directive is based on the monitoring by the financial 
sector of unusu(ll  or suspicious behaviour and the obligatory reporting of such behaviour 
to  the authorities. The response  in  terms of numbers of reports  made  does  provide an 
indication of the effort made and of the effectiveness of the systems put in  place.  The 
financial sector, ·and  the banking sector in particular, has made considerable efforts and 
undertaken considerable expenditure to make the system effective. They have themselves 
been calling for feedback to show that their efforts are worthwhile and to enable them to 
further develop their response. 
20 Annex 8 shows the  number of suspicious transactions reported  to  the  uuthorities  in  the 
Member States. Although it  should be  borne in  mind that the range of persons under an 
obligation to  report suspicions and the range of suspected criminal behaviour (predicate 
offences) which should give rise to reports differ from one Member State to  another the 
data reported show that the suspicious transaction reporting system appears to be working 
fairly well. 
On the other hand, much less data is currently available on the prosecutions, convictions 
and seizures of money resulting, in whole  or in  part,  from  the  suspicious transactions 
reports. 
A  number of Member States  do  not  have  a  separate  money  laundering .offence  and 
prosecute under the  heading of "receiving".  This  probably precludes the collection  of 
separate data on money laun~ering cases. 
In other cases the financial intelligence unit (FlU) serves as a filter and will only pass on 
a proportion of  the cases it  e~amines to the jud.!cial or police authorities, at which point it 
may lose touch with the particular case. It would appear that there is not always detailed 
feedback from those authorities to the FlU which would enable it to  maintain a record of 
the number of reports leading to prosecution and conviction. 
The  lengthy  nature of many  investigations and  prosecutions also  makes  it  difficult  to 
provide  results  data,  especially  when  the  anti-money.  laundering ·systems  have  only 
recently  been  put  in  play  or  are  still  evolving. ·Furthermore  several  Member  States 
provided data in a form which was not readily comparable with that obtl:lined from others. 
The relatively simple form of questionnaire sent by the Commission was clearly difficult 
for certain Member States to complete and the data received did not always lend itself tq 
summarisation in tabular form. 
Annex  9  attempts  to  provide  some  indication  of results  of the  suspicious  transaction 
reporting  system  and  of the  number  of prosecutions  and/or  convictions  for  money 
laundering in  number of Member States.  It  is  clear that a considerable effort would be 
necessary  in  a  number or  Member  States  in  order to  provide  more  useful  figures.  In 
certain Member Stales data on money  laundering prosecutions and  convictions  simply 
does not exist at present · 
Similarly, little data is_ available so far on amounts of money seized and/or confiscated. 
Once  again the  exercise of data collection  is  inherently  difficult.  Cases  are  long  and 
complex and  amounts  may  remain  frozen  for  long  periods  before  being  definitively 
seized or ultimately returned.  It does not appear that large amounts are being confiscated 
·and there are indications, from certain Member States, that much of the money seized or 
frozen ultimately has to be returned or released. 
21 Examples. of the  information  supplied  to  the  Commission  are  as  follows  :  Since  the 
creation of  the Belgian FlU in December 1993, an amount of BF 3 116 million has been 
confiscated in cases following disclosures made to the Fly. Denmark reported that some 
DKK 50 million had been confiscated, DKK 18  million had been paid back or paid in 
damages and DKK 12  million had been imposed as  supplementary fines.  Ireland reports 
the seizure of £1RL  15  500.  In Italy, the figures. for  1996 showed the following amounts 
being seized (not confiscated): Lit 3 002 million under Article 648 bis of the Criminal 
Code (money laundering) and Lit 68  631  million under Article 648 ter (use of money, 
goods or assets or unlawful origin). The UK  confiscated nearly £  I 0.5  million  in  1996. 
Luxembourg  has  seized  over  LUF  300  million  in  connection  with  the  cases  it  is 
prosecuting and  has also  given effect to  a  confiscation order  for  some  OEM  200 000 
issued by the German courts. The conviction in Portugal resulted in the confiscation of 
ESC 2.5 million, while investigations are in  hand concerning almost ESC 1  800 million 
in  cash and  property.  Sweden  reports  that  a  total  of KR  124  million  was  seized  or 
otherwise secured in  1  996-97. 
The Commission does not pretend  that the  amount of data it  is  able  to  supply to  the 
Council and Parliament at this stage is  satisfactory.  The Commission will  continue to 
work with the Member States in the Contact Committee to improve the situation, but is 
fully aware that this will not be easy. The involvement of  judicial and police authorities 
under the third pillar and of EDU/Europol will without doubt als()  he necessary. 
There may also be the potential for a contribution, at least in  the medium or longer term, 
from the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction. Council Regulation 
(EC) 302/93  in  paragraph 5 of its  Annex  A  includes the collection of information on 
money laundering within the Centre's fifth priority area of  work. 
22 IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This second Commission report to the Council and Parliament on the implementation of 
the  1991  anti-money laundering Directive confirms that this legislation has been applied 
conscientiously in all the Member States.  · 
The  Member  States . of  the  European  U'nion  thus  continue .  to  demonstrate  their 
commitment to  fighting  against  money  laundering  and  to .  set  a  good  example  to  our 
neighbours in Europe and to countries further afield.  ..  ' 
The ·global nature of the problem and the need for a global response arc reflected in  the 
Member  States'  and  Commission's  continued  support  for  the  Financial  Action  Task 
Force, and in the anti-money laundering technical assistance being provided via PHARE, 
in the Caribbean and in other regions. 
This  reflects  the  realisation  that  the  European  Union's  money  laundering  defences, 
however tight they may be, can easily be compromised by weaknesses elsewhere. 
Member  States'  legislation  is  not,  however,  limited  to  the  implementation  of the 
Directive. Even apart from the purely thirq pillar aspects, the Member States' readiness to 
further develop this legislation beyond· what is requited by the Directive is proof that they 
fully  realise  the  long-term  and  evolving  nature  of the  threat  that  is  posed  by  money 
laundering and of the effort that is required to combat it. 
This. evolution  means  that  the  1991  money  laundering  Directive  risks  appearing 
. somewhat 'out-of-date. in certain respects and this naturally poses the question of  whether 
it should be updated. 
The' first  issue that needs to  be considered in  this  context is  that of the prohibition of 
money  laundering.  Is  it  necessary,  to  quote  the  updated  FATF  recommendation,  "to 
extend the offence of drug money laundering to  one based on serious offences" ?  As 
Annex 4 shows, all the Member States have already.made considerable progress in this 
direction. 
At the same time, if the Directive were to  be amended to cover other predicate offences, 
this·  would  again  raise  the  issue  of  prohibition  as  opposed  to  criminalisation. 
Criminalis<ttion via the Directive continues to  be rejected by a number or Member States, 
whid1 would appear to  leave a wider prohibition as the best option .. Furthermore, givl!n 
the  obvious  dil'liculty  ol'  reaching  an  agreed  dclinition  or what  constitutes  "serious 
crime",  it  is  most  p'robable  that  even  an  amended  Directive  would  leave  scope  f(n 
differences in coverage between one Member State and  another and  would not achieve 
full harmonisation in this area.  ·  ' 
Nevertheless, the Commission believes that the need to  keep this  important instrument 
up-to-date  argues  strongly  in  favour  of a widening of the  range  of predicate offences 
covered.  . 
23 As  regards  the  actiVIties  falling  within  the  scope of the  Directive  it  is  clear that  the 
coverage of  the financial sector is fairly comprehensive. 
On the other hand many activities and professions outside the financial sector ~e  already 
or are potentially vulnerable to  money laundering. The situation is  in  constant evolution 
as launderers seek new openings. 
Article 12 of the  1991  Directive shows that Member States were already then aware of 
the  dangers.  They  committed  themselves  to  apply  provisions  of the  Directive  as 
appropriate  to  activities  outside  the  1inuncial  sector  when  there  was  a  real  danger of 
money laundering. 
Annex 6 shows that Member States have i,ndeed  been ready to put this commitment into 
effect in an increasing number of cases,  and  as their experience of combating money 
laundering develops. 
In adopting the Action Plan on organised crime in June 1997, following its approval by 
the  Justice and  Home Affairs  Council,  the  Heads of State  or Government of the  EU 
Member States have now given their backing to a general extension by the end of 1998 of 
the suspicious transaction reporting requirement to  persons and professions outside the 
financial  sector.  Although  this  is  not  spelt  out,  it  is  the  Commission's  view  that  an 
obligation  to  report  suspicious  transactions  presupposes  correspl)nding  customer 
identification and record-keeping requirements. 
This being the  case,  the  Commission must  be  prepared  to  assume  its  responsibilities 
under its first pillar competence. Accordingly the Commission has concluded that a new 
directive is needed and  its services have begun work on a new proposal for a directive, 
the main provision of which will be a major extension outside the financial sector of the 
obligation to report suspicions of  money laundering. 
The Council's conclusions on the Commission's first report laid particular emphasis on 
cooperation between anti-money laundering authorities.  The Commission supports and 
has agreed to finance, under the Oisin programme, the feasibility study for an information 
exchange  system  relating  to  money  laundering  information  held  by  _the  EU  police-
authorities. As regards the exchange of money laundering information between financial 
intelligence units (Fills) the Commission is concerned hy  the difficulties (as reflected in 
Annex 7)  which still appem to  prevent the communication and  exchange of' inli>rmation 
between certain units having a diflcrentlegal status. 
As regards the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, an exchange 
of  information  between  the  police  and  judicial  prosecution  authorities  and  the 
Commission is already provided for.  However, a structured cooperation and exchange of 
information between the FlUs themselves and between them and the Commission at the 
level  of administrative  mutual  assistance  is  also  needed.  For  this  purpose  a  clearly 
defined legal framework should be established at Community level. 
24 The Commission commends the excellent work,  at  an  increasingly  international  level, 
carried out by  the Egmont Group.  It  invites the  Member States to  consider whether it 
might be worthwhile to bring together the FlUs of the Member States to discuss ways of 
promoting improved cooperation within the European Union context. 
At the same time the Commission services arc urgently considering whether the proposal 
to update and extend the  1991  Directive could usefully address any of the issues relating 
to relations between FlUs.  ~ 
Finally,  as  regards  the  results  of the  money  laundering  effort,  the  Commission  will 
continue to  seek to be able to  provide inore detailed and more comprehensive statistics. 
The Commission notes the interest of Europol in this area and believes that Europol will 
be  able to  play an important role  in the collection of data on prosecutions, convictions 
and asset confiscations. The Commission proposes henceforward to  include restdts data 
in every implementation report it presents to the Council and Parliament. 
Despite the relative lack of statistics _it can be concluded that while the financial sector's 
response has generally been good in terms of  the number of  suspicious transaction reports 
made to  the  competent authorities  it  does  not seem  that this  effort is  at  present being 
translated  into  large  numbers  of prosecutions,  convictions  or asset  confiscations.  The 
~ommission would stress once again that the directive has an  important preventive role 
and believes  that the directive has been successful in making access to the EU's financial 
system  more  difficult  for\ criminal  money.  At  the  same  time  it  is  clear  that money 
laundering  is  going  on  and  that  suspicious transaction  reports  must  be  pinpointing  a 
proportion of that criminal money. That being the case it has to be noted that the results 
beyond the directive in the police and judicial spheres appear to be  limited, even if on the 
increase.  While  it  is  not  within  the  remit of this  report to  analyse  the  reasons  for  this 
situation, it is clearly crucial that the commitment of  the financial sector, and increasingly· 
of  the other sectors called on to participate in the fight against money laundering, should 
be justified in terms of a successful criminal law response. There is no doubt that this is 
an area in which much further work is needed. 
25 ANNEX  1 
COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS 
The Council has .  examined the first  Commission report on  the  implementation of the 
Directive concerning· the fight against money laundering. 
The Council noted with great interest the analysis set out by the Commission in its report 
as  well  as the conclusions  which  were drawn.  The  Council  largely agrees  with  those 
conclusions. 
As the Commission points out, the application of  the Directive has had a clear impact on 
the setting-up by the Member States of systems for countering money laundering. The 
progress already achieved is very encouraging but there is a neeq for continued efforts at 
national. as well as at European and international levels, to  increase the effectiveness of 
systems for'countering money laundering. 
The  Council  invites  Member  States  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  ensure  full  and 
complete application of  the Directive. 
It notes with satisfaction that the possibility is being explored of bringing about a more 
coordinated application ofthe Directive, particularly with respect to the activities brought 
within its scope and to the professions and types of  undertakings which are subject to the 
Directive's provisions, taking into account the special status of  legal professions.  · 
The Council would like the Commission to continue to reflect on these questions in close 
collaboration  with  the  Member States'  representatives,  meeting  in  the  context of the 
Contact Committee set up by the Directive. 
The  Council  agrees  entirely  with  the  Commission's  view  that  the- strengthening  of 
systems for  countering money  laundering  depends  on closer cooperation  between the 
different authorities involved in  fighting this phenomenon. The Council would like the 
Commission also to continue to  reflect in  depth on this question, in· accordance with its 
powers. More generally, requests all the relevant bodies to step up their discussions and 
to increase their cooperation in this area whenever necessary. 
The Council invites the Commission to pursue the study of these different questions and 
to submit to it any appropriate proposals, taking account of experience gained since the 
adoption of the Directive, of its implementation in each of the Member States, and of 
work carried out on these same questions by other international bodies. In any event, the 
Council invites the Commission t.o  report to it within eighteen months on its thinking on 
these questions . 
26 ANNEX  2 
. Parliament's Resolution on the first Commission report to the European Parliament 
and the Council on implementation of Directive 91/308/EEC on money laundering 
(COM(95)54- C4-0137/95) 
(Official Journal No. C 198,  8-7-1996,  p. 245) 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to Council Directive 91/308/EEC of I 0 June 1991  on the prevention of the 
use of  the financial system for the purpose of  money laundering (OJ L 166, 28-6-1991, p. 
77.),  -
having  regard to  the  first  Commission  report  on  the  implementation  of the  Money 
Laundering Directive to  be  submitted  to  the  European  Parliament and  to  the  Council 
(COM(95)54 - C4-0 13 7  /95) 
having regard to  the Council of Europe Convention on laundering, tracing, seizure and 
confiscation of  proceeds of  crime concluded in Strasbourg in  1990, 
having  regard  to  the  UN  Convention  against  Illicit  Traffic  in  Narcotic  Drugs  and 
Psychotropic Substances concluded in Vienna in 1988, 
having regard to  the recommendations on  money laundering adopted by the Council of 
Ministers of  Justice and Home Affairs at its ·meeting in Copenhagen on 1-2 June 1993, 
having  regard  to  the  opinion  of experts  in  .  the  fields  of banking  supervision  and 
prosecution who  reported  at  the  meeting  of 20  December  1995  of the  Committee on 
Legal  Affairs  and  Citizens'  Rights  and  the  Committee on  Civil  Liberties  and  Internal 
Affairs on the problems of  implementing and transposing the Directive in practice, 
having regard to the Council_Act drawing up the Convention based. on Article K.3 of  the 
Treaty on European Union on the  establishment of a European Police-Office -(Europol 
Convention) (OJ C 316,27-11-1995, p.I.), 
having regard its resolution of 14 March 1996 on  i~uropol (OJ C 96, 1-4- I 996, p.  288.), 
having regard  to  the  report of the  <. 'ommittee on  I  .egal  Affairs and  <  'itizens'  Rights and 
the opinions of the Committee on  Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, the Committee on 
Budgetary Control and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy (A4-0 187  /96), 
A. whereas  financial transactions connected with criminal activities are conti~uing, 
B.  whereas the European Union's system for combating money laundering is inadequate 
and in particular does not sufficiently cater for new forms of financial transaction, 
27 C.  whereas  both  \Vithin  states  and  at  European·  level  new  legislative  measures  are 
required to ensure comprehensive supervision of all natural and legal persons involved in 
the commercial conduct of financial transactions, 
D ..  whereas.  the  1990  Strasbourg  Convention  already  contains  provisions  on  legal 
assistance which would make it  possible to  combat the  economic  use  of proceeds of 
crime efficiently at European level, 
E.  whereas,  although  Title  VI  of the  Treaty  on  European  Union  contains  adequate 
provisions on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs,  there is no sign of 
comprehensive  legislative  activities  being  carried  out to  improve  coordination of the 
work of  judicial and police authorities at European level, 
F.  in the belief that the rapid establishment of a European Police Office pursuant to the 
Europol  Convention could make a major contribution to  effective measures to  combat 
money laundering and the crimes giving rise to it, 
G.  whereas,  in  its  recommendations of 1993,  the  Council  of Ministers or Justice and· 
Home Artairs described both the ratiJication and implementation or the  1990 Strusbourg · 
Convention  and  the  involvement  of Europol  as  important  steps  to  combat  money 
laundering, 
1.  Calls on  the  Commission  to  ensure  full  transposition  of the  Directive  and  submit 
within the next two years a detailed report indicating the number o.f transactions reported, 
the number of  proven cases of  money laundering, the number of  people convicted and the 
amounts confiscated  ~ 
2.  Takes the view that the  European Union's  system  for  combating money laundering 
should  be  organised  more  efficiently  and  adapted  in  accordance  with  technical 
developments in  financial transactions : 
J.  Calls  on  the  Commission,  therefore,  to  report  on  new  types  or money  laundering 
arising from changes in business practices and money transfers, and to submit appropriate 
proposals for combating it as part of  a revision of  the Directive ; 
4.  Calls  on  the  Commission,  taking  account  of the  preliminary  work  of the  Contact 
Committee, to  submit a proposal  tor a revision of the  Directive as  quickly as  possible, 
and not later than 6 March 1998, to include within its direct scope those occupations and 
types of. enterprise which can definitely  be considered to  be  involved  or likely  to  be 
involved directly or indirectly in money laundering  ~ 
5.  Calls on the Member States, insofar as they have not already done so, to extend their 
legislation  on  combating  money  laundering  not  only  to  money  derived  from  drugs 
trafticking but to all money acquired from professional and organised crime ; 
28 6.  Welcomes  the  Commission's  aim  of making  explicit and  binding  reference  to  the 
provisions of the  money  laundering directive  in  all  future  partnership  and  association 
agreements and stepping up  cooperation with the respective contracting parties  in this 
field  ~ 
7.  Calls  on  the  Member  States to  ratify  and  apply  the  UN  Convention  against Illicit. 
Traffic  in  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic  Substances  adopted  in  Vienna  on  19 
December  1988 and the  Council of Europe Convention on laundering, tracing,  seizure 
and-confiscation of proceeds of crime opened for signature in Strasbourg on 8 November-
1990, which the Member States undertook to do  in the 'Declaration by the representatives 
of the governments of the  Member States meeting within the Council'  published in  the 
annex to the Money Laundering Directive ; 
8.  Considers that appropriate procedural provisions should exist or be  introduced in  all 
Member States to make it possible: 
(a)  for  surveillance  of telecommunications  to  be  ordered  if there . are  grounds  for 
suspecting that a money laundering offence has been or is about to be committed: 
(b) for temporary measures, such as provisional impoundment and seizure, to be taken to 
prevent  the  exchange,  transfer  or disposal  of financial  property  derived  from  money 
laundering or criminal offences giving rise to it, · 
(c) for temporary measures as referred to in (b) to be taken if the competent authorities  · 
have information constituting adequate grounds for suspecting an offence; 
(d)  for  the  proceeds of money  laundering  or criminal  offences giving rise  to  it  or the 
financial property acquired with these proceeds to be-confiscated ; 
9.  Calls oh the Membcr Stales to continue thcir work on thc  Europol  C~onvcntion  with a 
view to con1erring on the Court of Justicc of the European Communities thcjurisdiction 
· called for by  Parliament pursuant to Article K3(2), second indent (c), third subparagraph, 
and  subseq~ently to ratify and apply the Convention ; 
10.  Hopes that the authorities of the Member States which are responsible for applying 
the provisions'ofthe Directive will use the avenues of  cooperation which exist·; 
11.  Stresses  that,  in  'order  properly  to  carry  out  their duties  of  registration  and 
notification, partly in accordance with Article 5 of the money laundering directive, banks 
and f!nancial  institutions must have  traine~  ·staff and monitoring capacity in order to be 
able  to  provide  the  requisite  expert  clarifi'cation  in  the  event ·of suspected  money 
laundering ; 
12. Calls on.the Commission-to set up a system of appropriate incentives to  ensure that 
the individual banks and  financial  institutions have trained staff and effective monitoring 
along the lines of  those proposed in paragraph II  ; 
29 13.  Considers  that  both  credit  and  financial  institutions  as  referred  to  in  the  second 
Directive on the coordination of banking law and all other natural and legal persons who 
carry  out financial  tninsactions,  or activities  particularly  likely  to  be  used  for  money 
laundering, commercially or on behalf of third parties should actually be included within 
the scope of  the Directive and subject to state supervision ; 
14.-Considers furthermore that this supervision should be exercised in accordance with 
uniform criteria throughout Europe; 
15.  Requests the Commission, pursuant to  Article  17 of the Directive (91/308/EEC), in 
its  second  report  on  the  implementation  of the  directive,  to  report  on  the  possible 
monetary effects that potentially stem from illegal money transactions such as : 
(a) the velocity of rrioney affected by  tlow of illegal funds  moving between countries of 
origin and of  destination. 
(b) the impact on money supplies of  countries involved in the circuit of  laundering, 
(c) the form of  investment illegal funds, once laundered, could take, 
(d) the transmission of monetary policy in countries involved, 
(e) the stability of financial  markets situated in  the circuit of money  laundering and of 
final destination ; 
16.  Also  requests the  Commission,  in  its  second  report to  act against  the  causes and 
activities  of illegal  money  transactions;  measures  contributing  to  a  solution  of the 
problem should be adopted such as 
(a)  including articles  in  trade agreements concerning  money  laundering to  require and 
ensure that partner countries adopt equivalent standards to those of  the European Union, 
(b) strengthening articles in  the European Agreements with the countries of Central and 
Eastern  Europe  concerning  money  laundering  to  require  and  ensure  that  associated 
countries adopt equivalent standards to those of  the European Union. 
(c)  strengthening articles  in  the Agreements  on  Partnership  and  Cooperation with  the 
Russian  Federation  and  the  New  Independent  States  of the  former  Soviet  Union  on 
money  laundering. to  require  and  ensure  that  associated  countries  adopt  equivalent 
standards to those ofthe European Union, 
(d) the drawing'up of  a list of'clean' banks, 
\ 
(e) ensuring that the Commission and its subcontractors deai only with 'clean' banks, 
(f) the vigilant enforcement of prudential  supervision within the  European  Union with 
regard to the licensing and operation of banks, 
(g)  including  articles  in  trade  agreements  regarding  the  adoption  or  Prudential 
Supervision  standards  to  require  and  ensure  that  partner  countries  adopt  equivalent 
standards to those of  the European Union; 
30 17·.  Wishes to have conclusive proof that  money  laundering  is  on the  increase and is 
increasingly powerful in the network of  organised crime ; 
18. Wishes to make it clear that money laundering can only be tackled effectively if it is 
tackled on a Europe-wide basis under single control and working in close liaison with the 
USA; 
19.  Calls  furthermore  on  the  Commission  to  propose  a  measure  prohibiting  financial 
involvement in  criminal  activities and. criminalising such  involvement in  the  Member 
States, Article 1  OOa of  the EC Treaty to be used as th~ legal basis for this measure ; 
20.  Calls on the Member States to step l:IP  action against money  laun~ering and to  give 
support to citizens and firms,  ~y providing information, so as to  be  able to prevent any 
involvement in money laundering; 
21.  Instructs its  President to  forward  this  resolution to· the  Council,  Commission and 
governments of  the .Member States. 
31. ANNEX  3 
Sigaature, ratification and implemeatation of the Vienna and Strasbourg Ceaveations 
Vienna Convention  Strasbourg Convention 
Signature  Ratification  Implementation  Signature  Ratification  Entry into force 
Art. 3-9  Implementation 
Belgium  y  y  y  y  y  '  y 
Denmark  y  y  - y  y  y  y 
Gennany  y  y  y  y  N  N 
Greece  y  y  y  y  N  N 
Spain  y  y  y  y  N  N 
France  y  y  y  y  y  y 
Ireland  y  y  y  y  y  y 
Italy  y  y  y  y  y  y 
Luxembourg  y  y  y  y  N  N 
Netherlands  y  y  y  y  y  y 
Austria  y  y  .Y  y  y  y 
Portugal  y  y  y  y  y  y 
Finland  y  y  y  y  y  y 
Sweden  y.  y  ·Y  y  y  y 
' 
United  y  y  y  Y.  y  y 
Kingdom 
32 ANNEX  4 
Criminal activities covered by the Member States' anti-money laundering 
legislation 
Belgium 
The  Penal  Code  (Article  505)  covers  tQe  laundering  of the  proceeds  of all  crimes. 
The specific anti-money laundering legislation (Law of 11-1-1993, as  amended) covers 
the laundering of proceeds linked to crimes involving: terrorism, organised criminality, 
drugs trafficking,  illicit trafficking  in arms  and  other goods,  trafficking  in  clandestine 
labour,  trafficking  in  human  beings,  prostitution,  illegal  use  of hormones  in  animals, 
trafficking in human organs or tissues, fraud prejudicing the financial interests of  the EU, 
serious and organised tax  fraud,  corruption of public officials, investment irregularities, 
swindling,  hostage-taking,  theft  or 'extortion  with  violence  and .threats  and  fraudulent 
bankruptcy; 
Denmark 
The Danish Money  Laund~ring Act refers  to  assets  originating from  violation  of the 
Danish Criminal Code (i.e.  all  crimes). However, "money laundering" is not a separate 
offence under Danish law but is dealt with under two "receiving" sections of  the Criminal 
Code-S 191(a), which makes it an offence to receive profit from a drug offence under 
S 191  and S 284, which creates an offence of accepting profits or helping,others to enjoy 
profits  from  theft,  misappropriation of objects  found,  embezzlement,  fraud,  computer 
fraud,  breach  of trust~  extortion,  fraud  against  creditors,  smuggling  of a  particularly 
serious nature and robbery. 
33 Germany 
Money  laundering is  a criminal offence pursuant to  Section 26I  of the Criminal Code 
(Money  laundering  ;  disguising  of illegal  assets).  The  money  laundering  predicate 
offences are as follows:· 
all  major crimes (Verbrechen) (i.e.  all  offences  carrying a  minimum  of one year's 
imprisonment, e.g.  serious forms of trafficking in people,  thetl and receiving as well 
as illegal trade in drugs and arms ; 
all less serious crime (Vergehen) under Section 29, subsection I, first sentence No I of 
the  Narcotics  Act  (  BeHiubungsmittelgesetz)  or  Section  29,  subsection  I  of the 
Commodities Control Act (Grundstoffliberwachungsgesetz), in particular illegal trade 
in narcotics and precursors (a 'Vergehen' is an offence carrying a minimum sentence 
of less than one year's imprisonment or a fine) ; 
certain  'Vergehen'  involving  property,  fraud,  document  and  corruption  offences 
committed  on  a  commercial  basis  by  a  member  of a  gang  formed  for  recurrent 
commission of  such offences (e.g. commercial and gang fraud) ; 
all Vergehen committed by a member of a criminal association within the meaning of 
Section 129 of  the Criminal Code (e.g. extortion, procuring and illegal gaming). 
On  16  January  1998  the  Bundestag passed  the  draft  law to  improve the fight  against 
. organised  crime.  This  will  extend  considerably  the  catalogue  of predicate  offences, 
especially in the field of  organised crime. 
Greece 
The Greek  Money  Laundering Law covers trafficking in drugs and  weapons,  robbery, 
blackmail,  kidnapping,  serious  larceny,  embezzlement  or  fraud,  illegal  trade  in 
antiquities, theft of  cargo of  a vessel, illegal trade in human tissue and organs, smuggling, 
nuclear crime, prostitution, illegal gambling. 
Spain 
The Penal Code article 301  covers money laundering under the section on receiving and 
similar offences. It  refers to all serious crime (any crime carrying a prison sentence in 
excess of 3 years). The otlence is considered to be aggravated when it relates to  a drugs 
trafficking otlence. 
The Spanish Money Laundering Law (of 23-12-1993) has as  its objective to combat the 
laundering of  the proceeds of  organised crime, terrorism and drugs trafficking. 
34 .  . 
France 
Law No 96-392 of 13-5-1996 amending the Penal Code extended the offence of money 
laundering to the proceeds of  all crimes (''crimes" or "delits")  . 
Ireland 
The  Criminal  Justice  Act  1994  criminalises  the  laundering  of the  proceeds  of "'drug 
trafficking or other criminal activity". 
Italy 
Law 328/1993 modified articles 648bis and ter of the Criminal Code to  criminalise the 
laundering  of the  proceeds  of all  intentional  criminal  activities  ("tutti  i  delitti  non 
colposi")  . 
.Luxembourg 
Current legislation only covers offences linked to drug-related money laundering. 
However,  a  draft  law  currently  before  the  Luxembourg  Parliament  would  extend  the 
range  of predicate  offences  to  any  crime  (carrying  a  penalty  of more  than  5  years 
imprisonment), to  ofTences  ("delits") involving organised crime and  to  certain otTences 
involving minors, prostitution, corruption of young people and arms and munitions. 
Netherlands 
The definition of the crime of receiving  in  the Criminal Code (Articles 416 - 417bis) 
covers the proceeds of  ~y  serious offence ("misdrijf'). 
Austria 
The Austrian Penal Code (Articles 165 and 27Ku) criminalises the laundering of all assets 
derived from serious  crime._ namely all  crimes ("Verbrechen") which, under Article  17( I) 
of the Criminal Code, carry a sentence of 3 years imprisonment. 
35 Portugal 
Decree  Law  15/93  made  drug  and  precursor  trafficking  a  criminal  offence  and 
criminalised money  laundering.  Decree  Law  313/93  transposed  the  money  laundering 
directive into  Portuguese law and  Decree Law  325/95  extended the  range of predicate 
offences to  terrorism,  arms trafficking,  extortion,  kidnapping,  prostitution, corruption 
and various serious economic and financial crimes. 
Finland 
The  money  laundering  relevant offence  in  the  Finnish  Penal  Code (the  t~rm "money 
laundering" is not used) covers the proceeds of  all offences. 
Sweden 
It is an offence to launder the proceeds of serious crime. Chapter 9 of the Swedish Penal 
Code, on receiving, states that it is an  offence to intentionally or by negligence launder 
the proceeds of any serious criminal offence carrying a penalty of imprisonment of more 
that 6· months. Complicity in  money laundering is  also criminalised. The term "money 
laundering" is not, however, used in the Penal Code. 
United Kingdom 
There is no general definition of  the term "money laundering" in the primary legislation. 
In effect it is an  offence to  launder the  proceeds of serious crime. This would include 
drug trafficking,  terrorism, theft and  fraud,  robbery,  forgery  and counterfeiting, illegal 
deposit taking, blackmail and extortion (essentially any conduct which would constitute 
an "indictable offence" in the UK). 
36 ANNEX  5 
Action plan to combat organised crime 
26.  In  the  lidd of money-laundering and  wniiscation of the  proceeds  from  crime,  the 
following measures should be envisaged : 
(a) to improve the international exchange of police data, it is necessary to set up a system 
for  exchanging  information  concerning  suspected  money-laundering  at  the  European 
level, in conformity with the  relevant rules relating to  data protection. To this end, the 
Europol Convention should be supplemented with a provision permitting Europol to  be 
instrumental therein (see political guideline No I 0) ; 
(b) criminalisation of laundering ofthe proceeds of crime should be made as  general as 
possible, and a legal basis should be created for as broad as possible a range of powers of 
investigation  into  it.  The  opportunity  of extending ·laundering  to  negligent  behaviour 
should  be  examined.  A  study  should  be  undertaken  with  a  view  to  strengthening  the 
tracing and  seizure of illegal  assets and  of the enforcement of court decisions  on the 
confiscation of  assets of  organised crime (see political guideline No 11) ; 
\ 
(c)  confiscation rules  should be  introduced which enable confiscation regardless of the 
presence of the ofTcndcr, such as when the offender has died or absconded (sec political 
guideline No 11)  ;_ 
(d)  there  should be a study of, the  possibility to  share,  at the  level  of Member States, 
assets, confiscated following international cooperation (see political guideline No II) ; 
(e)  the  reporting obligation in Article 6 of the  Money-Laundering Directive should be 
extended to all  offences connected with serious crime and  to  persons  and professions 
other than the  financial  institutions mentioned in the Directive.  Member States should 
examine the opportunity of making the failure to  report suspicious transactions liable to 
dissuasive sanctions (see political guideline No  11 ).  At the same time, fiscal authorities 
should be subjected in the national law to a similar reporting obligation for transactions 
connected with  organised crime,  at  least  for  transactions  relating  to  VAT and  excise. 
Cooperation between contact points under the Directive need to be improved; 
(f} addressing the  issue of money-laundering on the  ln~ernet and  via electronic  money 
products and  requiring, in  electronic payment and  message systems, that the  messages 
sent give details of  the originator and the beneficiary (see political guideline No II) ; 
(g) preventing an excessive use of cash payments and cash currency exchanges by natural 
and legal persons from  serving to  cover up  the conversion of the proceeds from  crime 
into other property (see political guideline No  11); 
37 Moreover,  the  Council  and  the  Commission  should  consider  in  the  light  of existing 
national  and  international  instruments the  need  to  put in  place  common provisions to 
combat organised crime in the fields of economic and commercial counterfeiting as well 
as counterfeiting and falsification of banknotes and coins in view of the introduction of 
the. single currency. 
Target date :end 1998. 
Responsible: Council/Europol/Commission. 
38 ANNEX  6 
Non-financial sector activities covered by the Member States' anti-money 
Belgium 
.Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
laundering legislation  -
A draft law will extend coverage to notaries, bailiffs (huissiers de justice), 
accountants and auditors, estate agents, casinos and transporters of  funds 
Casinos 
Casinos, auctioneers, other businesses not already subject to the obligation 
to  cooperate  under  the- money  laundering. law  and  any- person  who 
administers another person's assets against payment 
Casinos 
Casinos, real-estate management companies, estate agents, jewellers, 
antique dealers, institutions involved in numismatics and philately 
All persons who professionally advise upon, execute or control operations 
involving  capital movements are obliged to notify the authorities of  any 
transactions which they know to be related to money laundering. _Certain 
limits are also placed on cash transactions. 
Government has announced its intention to cover solicitors, auctioneers, 
estate agents and accountants 
Transactions over LIT 20 million must be carried out through a financial 
intermediary. 
New  legislation  adopted  in  1997  provides  for  an  accelerated  procedure 
whefeby  non-financial  activities  can  be  brought  under  the  anti;;.money 
laundering legislation. 
Luxembourg The draft law covers casinos, games of  chance, auditors and notaries; 
Netherlands  Casinos.  Notaries  have  announced  voluntary  scheme  to  report  very 
suspicious transactions indicating serious cases of money laundering. 
Lawyers and accountants already have a similar arrangement. 
Austria 
Portugal 
Casirios 
Casinos, real  estate agents (brokers imd dealers), real estate management 
companies,  companies  organising  gambling  or  lotteries,  antique/art 
dealers, jewellers, aircraft, boat and car dealers 
39 Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
(Draft legislation covers casinos, betting offices and real estate agents) 
Companies administering trusts 
The  principal  legislation  covers  all  persons.  The  money  laundering 
regulations  cover  all  persons  and  institutions,  including  lawyers  and 
accountants,  when  undertaking  banking,  investment or insurance-related 
business. 
40 ANNEX  7 
Financial intelligence units 
Findings of the Egmont Group as regards cooperation I exchange of information 
General possibility of  bilateral agreements I direct exchange of  information 
I.  For intelligence purposes 
Italy, Portugal, Sweden 
2. For intelligence purposes and for criminal investigation or prosecution purposes : 
Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, UK 
Limited 
Austria 
Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Finland (FSA) 
No  exchange  with  administrative  units 
inform.ation 
No exchange with administrative units 
no  law  enforcement 
No exchange with administrative units and judicial authorities 
No  exchange  with  police  or  judicial  authorities  ;  no  law 
enforcement  -information 
41 ANNEX  g· 
Number of  suspicious transaction reports 
I  MEMBER STATES 
I 
1994.  1995  1996  1997 1 
Belgium11  2183  3926  5771  7747 
Denmark  200  174  254 
Germall'By  3282  2935  3289 
GJJ"eeee  38 
Sl!)ain  163  670 
France  684.  866  902  nn 
Ireland  199 (part) I  378 
ntaly  1034  2961  3218 
1Luxembourg9  75  77 
NetheiJ"Bands  (unusl8~!1)  84 753  15 007  16 0~7  +/-87 OdJO 
(suspicious)  3546  2994  2 572 
Austria  346  310  301 
Portugal  17  85  115  129 
Finland  223  190  232  206 
§wed  en  429  391  502  9@9 
United Kfirngdom  15 007  13170  ]6 125  ]4 1148 
The ligures for Belgium relate to·564, 795, 1317 and 1484 cases respectively. 
lj  The reports for the two years n:late to 90 I and 3264 transactions respectively. 
42 Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
ANNEX 9 
Results of the reporting system, prosecutions .and convictions 
Cases transmitted  to  the  Crown  Prosecutor:  1994  - 117;  1995  --:  149  ; 
1996-321  and 1997 - 495; Since 1994 there have been convictions in 48 
cases following reports from the Belgian FIU to the judicial authorities. 
Comprehensive  statistics  on  prosecutions ·and  convictions  are  not· 
available, though it is known that there have been a number of  convictions 
for  drug  money  laundering. (7  in  1994  and  5  in  1995).  As regards  the 
results  of the  reporting  system,  35  reports  have  resulted  in, 26  ca~es 
(various  offences)  in  which  49  persons  have  been  convicted  or  have 
agreed to pay administrative fines. One person has been acqu_itted. 
16 persons were convicted in 1994, 15 in 1995 and 24 in 1996. 
Of the 38 cases reported to  the Committee set up  under Law No 2331 of 
24.8.1995, 13 cases have been sent to the Public Prosecutor 
Suspicious  transactions  passed  on  to  police  or  judicial  authorities 
1995- 19, 1996- t 65. 
Dossiers  passed  to  judicial  authorities  :  1994  - · 22  ;  1995  - 30  : 
1996 - 47  ;  1997  - 75.  As  of end  96,  there  had  been  34  definitive 
convictions (25 since 1993).  However, this figure is notexhaustive, other 
cases being prosecuted under t~e heading of  receiving ('recel'). 
One conviction obtained to date. 
Convictions for money laundering under Art 648 his (money laundering) 
and  Article 648ter (use of money, goods or assets of unlawful  origin)  : 
1993- 72and 1; 1994-58and4; 1995-62and3; 1996-116and9. 
Suspicious  transaction  reports  have  led  to  85  penal  proceedings  being· 
initiated, 16 for money laundering and 69 for other offences. 
Luxembourg Two domestic cases arc currently pending 
Netherlands  No  precise statistics on  money  laundering  prosecutions and  convictions. 
Approx. 5 000 "receiving" cases arc investigated annually. 
43 Poll"tugaD 
!Fnnhmi!ll 
Swede1rn 
UK 
· A formal accusation has been made in  13  proceedings. These have led to 3 
convictions ( 1 in  1994 and 2 in  1995 ), one of  which involved two persons; 
Four trials  ended  in  acquittal.  In  one  of the  prot:ccdi ngs  which  led  to  a 
conviction,  another  Member  State  was  requested  to  take  proceedings 
against other persons. 
The reports gave rise to  12  investigations in  1994, 49 in  1995  and 53  in 
1996. Prosecutions were  launched in 3 cases, involving 26 persons.  One 
person was convicted in 1996 
Between  1994  and  1997,  119  suspicious  transaction  reports  were 
transferred  to  pre-trial  investigations,  leading  to  70  criminal  cases.  Of 
these  cases,  by  end  1997  the  Courts  had  passed  judgement  in  13. 
Proceedings were pending in  4.  Charges were  being considered in  4.  21 
cases were dropped and pre-trial investigations were still continuing in 28. 
A  total  of 66  reports  were  passed  to  the  prosecution  authorities  for 
preliminary investigation in  the  period  1994 - 97.  Over the same periqd 
there were 21  judgements. 
Between 1993 and 1996 there were 25  convictions for money laundering, 
of which  13  in  1996. Although only 1 prosecution for money laundering 
resulted from  a suspicious transaction report there were over 200 known 
prosecutions for other offences in 1996 as a result of reports passed on to 
police or investigative authorities. 
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